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Metaphorsin law are to be narrowly watched,for startingas devices to
liberate thought they often end by enslaving it.'
-Benjamin Cardozo
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM: CREATIVE ORIGINALISM

Building the Wall

In 1947 the United States Supreme Court initiated modem establishment
clause2 jurisprudence by issuing an opinion' that produced a policy-oriented
result from reasoning based on original intent. 4 The Court reached this result by extracting, out of context, Thomas Jefferson's "wall of separation"
metaphor from a letter he wrote over ten years after the establishment
clause's adoption and making that metaphor the opinion's theoretical centerpiece.' That metaphor became the focus for subsequent establishment clause
1. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. The establishment clause requires that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion .. " Id.
3. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). Justice Black, writing for the majority, stated the crux of the opinion by defining the establishment clause to mean:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another ....No tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.... In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and state."

Id.
4. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-12 (Court sought original intent of the establishment clause
from framers' writings). Justice Black relied almost exclusively on the writings of James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson as the basis for interpreting what the framers intended. Id.;
Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973)(White, J., dissenting) (Court's
desire to implement national policy on church and state relations created imposing "wall of
separation"). See generally G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 1-13
(1987) (examining the historical implications of Everson); Bradley, Imagining the Past and
Remembering the Future: The Supreme Court'sHistory of the Establishment Clause, 18 CONN.
L. REV. 827, 842 (1986) (Court's establishment clause jurisprudence result of desired national
policy regarding church and state relations); Bradley, Dogmatomachy -A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion Cases, 30 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 275, 287-88 (1986) (propagation of policy goals,
not historical reliance, basis for Court's establishment clause rulings); Cornelius, Church and
State - The Mandate of the EstablishmentClause, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 20-21 (1984) (nothing
in Constitution mandated "wall of separation").
5. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-18. Justice Black relied on Jefferson's letter to the Danbury
Baptists, which was first quoted by the Court in Reynolds v. United States. Id.; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist
Convention). Jefferson's letter stated:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God,
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers
of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign rever-
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analysis, and set a philosophical tone that resonated through all future decisions regarding church and state activity.6 Operating under the assumption
that the "wall of separation" represented the establishment clause's true
meaning,7 the Court gradually developed a series of tests designed to determine whether particular state action impermissibly breached that wall.8
The current version of this jurisprudential development is the Lemon
ence that act of the whole American People which declared that their legislature should
"make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof," thus building a wall of separation between church and state.
Id. (emphasis added). In Reynolds, Chief Justice Waite said that, as to matters of religion,
Jefferson's view "was the authoritative declaration as to the scope of the establishment clause."
Id. See generally J. EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 242-45 (1987) ("wall
of separation" was taken out of context by Court). Jefferson probably was paraphrasing Roger
Williams, founder of religiously tolerant Rhode Island, who wrote: "[w]hen they have opened
a gap in the hedge or wall of separation between the garden of the church and the wilderness of
the world ... His garden and paradise... must be walled in peculiarity unto Himself from the
World .... "Id. at 243; Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 12-13 (1978-79) (Roger
Williams' view of separation forbade only governmental aid to religion that hindered religious
freedom).
6. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S. 38, 53 n.37 (1985) (quoting Everson's application
of "wall" metaphor); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 603, 612 (1973) (Everson's "wall of separation" created a "forbidden territory" regarding state action in religious affairs); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) (used "wall of separation" to strike down statute prohibiting the teaching of evolution); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 n.20 (1962) (quoting Roger
Williams on strict separation of church and state); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 493
(1961) (Court used "wall of separation" to invalidate religious test for state office); McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948) (relied on "wall of separation" to invalidate students early release from school for religious training). See generally Note, Jefferson and the
Church-State Wall: A Historical Examination of the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 645, 646-50 (reviewing history of Court's application of "wall of separation").
7. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. Justice Black's opinion reflected a belief that religion and state
affairs were separate spheres, and that the law should substantiate that separation through the
establishment clause. Id.
8. See School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (Court developed
"purpose/effect" test stating if statute's effect or purpose advanced or inhibited religion, then
legislation violated establishment clause); Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-47
(1968) (supplying teaching materials to parochial school did not violate "purpose/effect" test);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 108-09 (1968) (applying "purpose/effect" test to invalidate
Arkansas antievolution statute); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (property tax
exemptions for religious organizations not violative of establishment clause). In Walz, Chief
Justice Burger applied the "purpose/effect" test but defined the effects prong to mean that
state action may not create excessive governmental entanglements with religion. Id. at 674-75;
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The Court created a three-pronged test
requiring state action: (1) to have a secular purpose; (2) to have a primary effect that neither
inhibits nor advances religion; and (3) to avoid excessive governmental entanglements. Id. See
generally Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and
the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 151, 151-59 (1987) (providing
evolution of establishment clause tests since Everson).
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test, 9 prescribed in 1971, which has yielded a number of establishment clause
cases whose contradictory
conclusions have blurred the legal effect of the
"wall of separation.' 0o The three-pronged Lemon test requires that for state
action to pass establishment clause scrutiny it must: (1)have a secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and (3) not foster excessive governmental entanglements with religion."1
Despite recent conflict regarding its workability,' 2 the Lemon test continues
9. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
10. The Court has issued conflicting decisions regarding the taxation of religious organizations. Compare Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, - U.S. _, _, 110 S.
Ct. 688, 699, 107 L. Ed. 2d 796, 814 (1990) (state tax statute had secular purpose, did not
advance or inhibit religion, and created no excessive entanglements) with Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 582-83 (1944) (license tax on religious booksellers burdened free exercise)
and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943) (license tax on door-to-door evange-

lists burdened free exercise). Compare Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,

-

U.S.

-,

-

109 S.

Ct. 890, 905, 103 L. Ed. 2d 1, 20 (1989) (tax exemption for religious publications violative of
establishment clause) with Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970) (taxing church
property does not burden right to free exercise of religion). The court has also handed down

contradictory decisons regarding religious displays on public property. Compare County of
Allegheny v. ACLU,

-

U.S.

-

-,

109 S. Ct. 3086, 3115-16, 106 L. Ed. 2d 472, 512 (1989)

(display of creche violated establishment clause, but menorah and Christmas tree display did
not) with Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (display of creche scene on public
property not impermissible endorsement of religion). The problem of state-sanctioned prayer
has also caused conflict. Compare Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68-69 (1985) (invalidating
compulsory prayer in public schools) with Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (permitted statute requiring legislative prayer). The use of school facilities within a "religious"
context has yielded contradictory Court decisions. Compare Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
248 (1977) (allowing state counseling of private school students away from parochial school)
with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (denying state guidance counseling for students on parochial school grounds). See generally G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATILN-

SHIPS IN AMERICA 8-9 (1987) (Justices' political agenda prompted creation of test); Conkle,
Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 1113, 1113-20
(1988). Professor Conkle explored the conflict between the "originalists," who rely on the
framers' intent to interpret the establishment clause, and the "nonoriginalists," who rely on
contemporary social conditions. Id.; Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court:
Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 935 (1987) (essential values underlying establishment clause require reformulation of the Lemon test); Johnson, Conceptsand
Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 839 (1984) (inconsistency in Lemon test application led to doctrinal mess in establishment clause jurisprudence); Choper, The Religious Clauses of the FirstAmendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U.
PrI-r. L. REV. 673, 680-81 (1980) (conflicts created by establishment clause and free exercise
clause interpretations have yielded serious inconsistencies in the caselaw); Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment and the Supreme Court,
24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 4-12 (1978-79) (framers' views on meaning of word "establishment" differ
from strict separation compelled by Jefferson's "wall").
11. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See generally Simson, The
Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 905 (1987) (examining the Court's application of Lemon's three-pronged test).
12. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, - U.S.....-, 109 S.Ct. 890, 905, 103 L. Ed. 2d
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to be the Court's chosen method
for determining whether state action vio13
lates the establishment clause.
B. StructuralFaults
The modem Court's adherence to the premise that the establishment
clause compelled a "wall of separation" between church and state activity
has caused recurrent problems in applying the Lemon test. 4 This premise
evolved from the Court's desire to derive an acceptable method for identifying impermissible church and state relations. Thus, the Court implicitly formulated a definition of the word "establishment" that greatly differed from
the framers' original understanding.15 If the Court had adopted an approach that accurately reflected the framers' intent, it would have obviated
much of the consequent establishment clause litigation, and would have left
a clearer, more durable framework for the resolution of subsequent establish-

1, 20 (1989) (deeply divided Court held tax exemptions for religious publications violated establishment clause); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, - U.S....109 S. Ct. 3086, 3115-16,
106 L. Ed. 2d 472, 512-13 (1989). In County of Allegheny, a divided Court could not agree on
the proper application of the Lemon test in finding that a creche display on public property
violated the establishment clause, but the display of a menorah did not. Id.
13. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization,

-

U.S.

-,

-,

110 S. Ct.

688, 698, 107 L. Ed. 2d 796, 814 (1990) (affirmed standard Lemon analysis in ruling religious
organization subject to state taxes); Texas Monthly, Inc., - U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 896, 103
L. Ed. 2d at 9 (1989) (applied Lemon test to find tax exemption for religious publication violative of establishment clause); County of Allegheny, - U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 3100-01, 106 L.
Ed. 2d at 493-95 (1989) (Court affirmed use of Lemon test as standard tool for determining
whether state action violates establishment clause).
14. See Texas Monthly, Inc., - U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 909, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 25-32
(1989)(Scalia, J., dissenting) (application of Lemon to deny tax exemption not founded on
Constitution, precedent, or history); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639-40 (1987)(Scalia,
J. dissenting) (criticizing inconsistent application of Lemon test); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402, 419 (1985) (application of Lemon criteria too formalistic); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,
394 (1983) (Lemon test nothing but helpful signpost). See generally Beschle The Conservative
as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151, 163-65 (1987) (cataloging alternatives to Lemon test's application
including Justice O'Connor's refinement of Lemon); Comment, The Lemon Test and Subjective
Intent in Establishment Clause Analysis: The Case for Abandoning the Purpose Prong, 76 Ky.
L.J. 1061, 1067-69 (1987-88) (Court has inconsistently applied the Lemon test); Note, Bowen v.
Kendrick- The Malleable Lemon Test, 40 MERCER L. REV. 1063, 1076-77 (1989) (Court has
invoked Lemon test, then failed to apply); Note, Developments in the Law - Religion and the
Law, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1644-50 (1987) (analyzing inherent problems in applying the
Lemon test); Recent Development, The Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court's New Establishment Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1198-1200 (1984) (examining weaknesses in
Court's application of Lemon test).
15. See Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U.L.
REv. 1113, 1129-1145 (1988) (comparing arguments that Supreme Court did and did not accurately apply framers' understanding of establishment clause in Everson).
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16
ment clause controversies.
To remedy the confusion that has ensued from the application of the establishment clause through the Lemon test, the Court should clarify its analysis by abandoning Lemon and adopting a test that more accurately reflects
the framers' original understanding of the word "establishment." 17 An establishment clause test faithful to the framers' original understanding would
proscribe state action which has religious purposes, and thereby provide
more distinct parameters regarding the establishment clause's scope.' 8 This
proposed test would examine whether the purpose of a challenged state law
is to advance a particular religious creed or doctrine or prescribe a mode of
religious worship. Narrowing Lemon's scope by eliminating "effects" and
"entanglements" analysis would not emasculate the precedential power of
previous establishment clause decisions, but instead would limit future litigation by replacing the indeterminate "wall of separation" with clearer, purpose-based limits on state action regarding religion."
Formulating a new establishment clause test faithful to the framers' understanding of the word "establishment" requires careful examination of the
relevant historical sources. Thus, this comment will begin by exploring the
colonial controversies regarding state-sponsored religious denominations,
and then follow with a thorough analysis of the establishment clause's legislative history. The analysis of the legislative history will focus particularly
on the alternative wordings proposed during the adoption debates. This
comment will then chronologically review the Supreme Court's application
of the establishment clause, beginning with an overview of early establishment clause decisions followed by a more detailed examination of contemporary cases. Finally, this comment will propose an alternative test designed to

16. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 3-4 (1987) (analyzing impact of Everson's policy-oriented result). Professor Bradley believes that Justice Black's
majority opinion created a tone of strict separation which affected the nature of subsequent
establishment clause analysis. See id. at 4-5. See generally Note, Prayingfor Direction: The
Establishment Clause and the Supreme Court, 10 NOVA L.J. 217, 218-44 (1985) (tracing increase in establishment clause litigation from 1960-1985).
17. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 144-45 (1987) (hypothesizing alternatives to Everson's legacy). If Justice Black had taken a broader account of
history, the parameters of the establishment clause would have become clearer, and the subsequent confusing judicial developments would have been obviated. See id.
18. See T. CURRY, THE FIRSr FREEDOMS 206-07 (1986) (reviewing Senate debates on
establishment clause). The Senate proposed more exact and revealing language regarding proscriptions on the establishment of religion. Id. The Senate's proposal, which would have provided clearer limits on state action, read: "Congress shall make no law establishing articles of
faith or a mode of worship." Id. at 207.
19. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 144-46 (1987).
Professor Bradley believes that a reformulation faithful to the framers original understanding
of the establishment clause would cause the biggest upheaval in academic circles, not in the
practical realm. Id.
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more faithfully measure whether state action impermissibly causes an establishment of religion.
II.

FOUNDATIONS OF MEANING:

RELIGION IN COLONIAL AMERICA

In colonial America the meaning of the phrase "establishment of religion"
was widely understood as a state preference for one religious denomination
over others.2' Many of those who had come to the new world were members
of minority denominations who had fled Europe to escape religious persecution.2 1 Despite their idealistic search for religious tolerance and liberty of
conscience, the early colonists ironically established state-sponsored reli-

gious denominations which, in some states, resulted in a repressive intoler-

ance of minority faiths. 2 However, no dominant national church evolved.
Instead, geographical factors defined the nature and extent of religious estab-

lishments.2 3 The New England colonies rejected traditional state establishments, and instead structured their laws to promote the local establishment

of Congregationalism. 24 The Southern states, which had retained substan-

tial ties with England, established Anglicanism as their state church.2" The
Mid-Atlantic states experienced diverse religious growth, and thus exhibited

20. See T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 209 (1986). Colonial Americans understood
"establishment" to mean the exclusive state preference for one religious denomination over
others. See generally Adams & Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 1559, 1594-1609 (1989) (describing framers' understanding of "establishment" at time of
creation of establishment clause).
21. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1947) (strife in Europe caused by
established churches brought settlers to America); see also Adams & Emmerich, A Heritage of
Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1559, 1561-81 (1989) (detailing colonial background
that provided foundation for establishment clause arguments); R. CORD, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE 4 (1982) (colonies were formed by religious dissidents fleeing European
repression).
22. Everson, 330 U.S. at 9-14. The American colonists established societies that discriminated against religious minorities, particularly Catholics, Quakers, and Baptists. Id.; see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 318-20 (1952) (problem of zealous sectarians generated need for
establishment clause); see also T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 132-33 (1986) (reviewing the
variety of sects in colonial America).
23. See School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 314 n.5 (1963) (at least eight
colonies had established churches). See generally G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 19-54 (1987) (overview of the regional break-down of religion in colonial
America).
24. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 20-27 (1987). The

establishment of Congregationalism in New England caused divisive disputes regarding the
propriety of state-established churches. Id. See generally T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS

105-33 (1986) (detailing difficulties in establishment of Congregationalism in New England).
25. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 30-33 (1987)

(Anglican dominance extensively affected politics of colonial South). See generally T. CURRY,
THE FIRST FREEDOMS 134-58 (1986) (reviewing establishment of Anglicanism in Southern
states).
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the greatest, though still limited, tolerance of religious minorities.2 6
Debate over the power of state-established churches in prerevolutionary
America focused on the political implications of state-sanctioned denominational preference. 27 Underlying these debates, however, was the generally
accepted belief that the colonies comprised a Christian nation, a belief which
yielded an intolerance for religious minorities.2 8 By 1775, ten of the thirteen
colonies had established some form of state religion.2 9 However, by the time
of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, only five state-established
churches remained.3 ° The trend towards disestablishment, inaugurated by
the Revolutionary War, continued until, by 1833, all states had abolished
denominational preferences.3 1
I1.

A.

WHAT DID THE FRAMERS INTEND?

In Search of Madison and Jefferson

The modem Supreme Court's initial analysis of the establishment clause
involved a thorough historical analysis of the framers' original understanding of the clause.3 2 In particular, the Court looked to the writings and ac-

26. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 46-52 (1987).

Rhode Island exhibited the most religious toleration, followed by Pennsylvania, Delaware, and
New Jersey. Id.
27. See T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 125-129 (1986) (examining debate between

Anglicans and Congregationalists over what constituted a state establishment of religion in
colonial America). See generally Kurland, The Origin of the Religion Clauses in the First
Amendment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 839 (1986) (providing overview of colonial intellectual
foundations and debates that set stage for creation of establishment clause).
28. See Adams & Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559,
1568-75 (1989) (comparing the varying degrees of religious liberty found in the colonies);
Note, Developments in the Law - Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1614 (1987)
(reviewing lack of toleration for religious dissidents and minorities in colonial America).
29. A. REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 96-97 (1985). Connecticut,

New Hampshire, and Massachusetts permitted the local establishment of Congregationalism,
and Virginia, North and South Carolina, New York, Maryland, New Jersey and Georgia had
established the Anglican Church as a state church. Id.
30. See R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 4 (1982) (gradual disestablishment of state churches occurred after American War of Independence). See generally Adams

& Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1575-79 (1989) (recognizing break with Revolutionary War as impetus for constitutional period that led to examination of relationships between church and state).
31. See Adams & Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559,
1582 (1989) (religious pluralism gradually forced disestablishment in all states); R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 4 (1982) (Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts
were last to disestablish their state churches).
32. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13, 31-33 (1947) (Court's majority and
dissenting opinions focused on historical analysis of framers' views to support analytical
theses).
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tions of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson to amplify the meaning of the
word "establishment." 3 3 The Court's excessive reliance on Madison and Jefferson, to the exclusion of other framers, is partially responsible for the recurrent problems in contemporary establishment clause jurisprudence.3 4
As a congressional representative from Virginia, Madison was most responsible for the development of the establishment clause. 35 Thomas Jefferson, on the other hand, was in Paris during the establishment clause
hearings, and thus his influence was felt only to the extent that his views
shaped Madison's. 36 While Madison and Jefferson agreed on the need to
limit the role of religion in Virginia's public affairs, they differed on the necessity of national religion clauses.3 7
Madison played a key role in the creation and adoption of Article 16 of
Virginia's Declaration of Rights in 1776, which was initially drafted by
George Mason.3" Madison's revision of Mason's language, which provided
33. See id. at 11-14. To support his "strict separationist" thesis in Everson, Justice
Black's majority opinion relied on Madison's pamphlet on religious liberty entitled Memorial
and Remonstrance, Jefferson's Bill for Religious Liberty, and Jefferson's 1802 letter to the

Danbury Baptist Association. Id.
34. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 86-87 (1987)

(Madison's writings are difficult source for finding meaning of establishment clause because of

inconsistent stances on church and state relations); R.

CORD,

SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND

121 (1982). In Everson, Justice Black selectively used the writings of Madison and
Jefferson to support his thesis. Id. As a result, Justice Black ignored Madison's role in creating the state chaplaincy system and his Thanksgiving Day proclamations. Id. He also ignored
Jefferson's Thanksgiving Day proclamations, his affirmation of the Northwest Ordinance, and
his Treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians, all of which demonstrated Jefferson's willingness to
accomodate a limited encroachment of religion into state affairs. Id.
35. See T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 198-200 (1986) (Madison prompted hearings
on Bill of Rights and proposed initial draft of religion clauses); Adams & Emmerich, A Heritage ofReligious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1579-80 (1989) (Madison was progenitor of
process to adopt Bill of Rights).
36. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163 (1878) (Jefferson absent from 1789 Constitutional Convention because he was in France); R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE 85-86 (1982) (Jefferson wrote Madison from Paris encouraging him to press for a Bill of
Rights).
37. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 n.3 (1985)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting
letter Madison wrote Jefferson in France). Madison wrote Jefferson that he did not think that
a national Bill of Rights was essential, but he said that he planned to support one because it
was "anxiously desired by others.. .[and] it might be of use, and if properly executed could not
be of disservice." Id. In his dissent in Wallace, Justice Rehnquist wrote that:
[t]he Court's opinion in Everson-while correct in bracketing Madison and Jefferson together in their exertions in their home State leading to the enactment of the Virginia
Statute of Religious Liberty-is totally incorrect in suggesting that Madison carried these
views onto the floor of the United States House of Representatives when he proposed the
language which would ultimately become the Bill of Rights. Id. at 98-99.
38. See T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 135 (1986). During the debates over the Virginia Declaration of Rights, Madison and Jefferson wanted to address the establishment issue,
STATE
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that "all men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the exercise of religion,"
was eventually passed by the Virginia Convention. 9 In 1779, Madison engineered the defeat of a Virginia bill which would have imposed a tax to support religious teaching." And in 1784, he successfully opposed a second tax
assessment bill for the support of religious teachers with his pamphlet on
religious liberty entitled A Memorial and Remonstrance. The modem
Supreme Court emphasized his pamphlet in Everson v. Board of Educ.
as evidence of the framers' original understanding of the word
"establishment." 4 1
Thomas Jefferson believed that any alliance between church and state authorities led to the corruption of both.42 Thus, in May of 1779, he submitted
a Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom to the Virginia General Assembly. 43 With this bill, Jefferson sought to ensure that denominational organizations would confine their actions to religious spheres, and not infringe on
the state's domain." The bill was defeated twice.45 However, in 1786,
James Madison reintroduced the bill and it was overwhelmingly passed by
the Virginia Legislature.' Madison and Jefferson's participation in Virginia's legislative activity regarding religion revealed their concerns for the
proper relationship of church and state and set the stage for their subsequent

but Patrick Henry, who believed religion should play a substantial role in state affairs, limited
their approach. Id.; L. PFEFFER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 14-15 (1977). Article 16 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights focused on Virginia's desire for religious liberty, but did not address the issue of establishing a state religion in Virginia. Id.
39. T. CURRY, THE FiRsT FREEDOMS 135-37 (1986) (despite Madison's and Jefferson's
efforts, Virginia retained its establishment of the Anglican church).
40. Id. at 146 (Tax Assessment Bill would have established Christian faith as Virginia
state religion).
41. 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947)(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (Justice Rutledge appended entire
text of Memorial and Remonstrance to his opinion).
42. See J. NOONAN, THE BELIEVERS AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 97-8 (1987) (Jeffer-

son's anti-clericalism based on fear that ecclesiastical law would interfere with the development of American common law).
43. See J. NOONAN, THE BELIEVERS AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 103-04 (1987) (Bill
for Establishing Religious Freedom propounded Jefferson's view that religion was matter of
personal opinion not open to civil intrusion by state).

44. Id.
45. See id. at 104 (1987) (text of Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom). See

generally Katz, Radiationsfrm Church Tax Exemption, 1970 SuP. CT. REV. 93, 96 (1970)
(twice-defeated bill reflected Jefferson's anticlericalism which was derived from his Enlightenment-influenced outlook).
46. See T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 146 (1986) (passage of Bill to Establish Religious Freedom in Virginia essentially disestablished the Anglican church in Virginia). See

generally Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution:An Equal Protection Approach to
Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 318-22 (1986) (Everson
wrongly conflated views of Madison's and Jefferson's Virginia struggle for religious freedom
with the views of framers of establishment clause).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol22/iss1/6

10

Bowen: Is Lemon a Lemon - Crosscurrents in Contemporary Establishment Cl

COMMENT

1990]

roles in shaping national policy.47

B. The CongressionalDebates
On May 4, 1789, James Madison announced that the Constitutional Convention would begin the process of amending the Constitution." On June 8,
he proposed a series of amendments, one of which addressed the national
desire for limits on governmental action regarding religion.4 9 Madison explained that the purpose of this amendment was to prevent the preeminence
of any religious sect.5 °
The committee hearings on the religion clauses began on August 15.51
The proposed amendment initially read: "[n]o religion shall be established

by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed." 2 Madison
stated that the amendment was intended to prevent Congress from establish-

ing a religion or compelling any mode of worship. 3 Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts then suggested a clause which declared that Congress could
establish no religious doctrine.54 In response, Benjamin Huntington of Connecticut, a state where public support of religion prevailed, complained that

47. See R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 20-47 (1982) (comparing
Madison's and Jefferson's political activity regarding church and state legislation); Hitchcock,
The Supreme Court and Religion: Historical Overview and Future Prognosis, 24 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 183, 184-85 (1980) (Madison's and Jefferson's separationist view of church and state
relations differed from most of their contemporaries).
48. See G.

BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA

85 (1987) (Madison

believed amendments were required to ensure passage of Constitution by all states).
49. See T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 198-99 (1986). Madison's first submission of
an amendment dealing with religious establishments read: "The civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext
infringed." Id.; see also Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling
Wall - A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly 1984, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 777-79 (1984) (emphasizing Madison's key role in creating establishment clause).
50. See Bradley, Dogmatomachy - A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion Clause Cases,
30 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 275, 329 (1986). Madison sought to prevent denominational preeminence
by insuring the freedom to exercise religious faith unhindered by the state. Id.; G. BRADLEY
CHURCH STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 87 (1987) (quoting I Annals of Congress 758
(1834)). Madison's specific intent was to prevent federal sanctioning of any religious sect. Id.

51. See T. CURRY,

THE FIRST FREEDOMS

200-02 (1986). See generally Adams & Em-

merich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559, 1579-82 (1989) (committee
hearings are key source for finding what establishment of religion means).
52. T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 200 (1986).
53. Id. at 200-02.
54. Id. at 200. Elbridge Gerry, Representative from Massachusetts, stated that the establishment clause should prevent government preference for any religious "doctrine" over
others. Id. His understanding of the word "establishment" is important because the establishment clause language ultimately adopted was drafted by Fisher Ames, Gerry's fellow Representative from Massachusetts. Id. at 206.
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Madison's proposal would inhibit his state's right to support religion. 5
Madison replied with an alternative wording which began "(n)o national
religion shall be established .... *56 However, Madison withdrew that offering after Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire argued that the clause
should require Congress to "make no laws touching religion. '"5 7 The committee then passed Livermore's proposal by a vote of thirty-four to twenty. 58
The debates resumed on August 20. Fisher Ames of Massachusetts immediately submitted the following proposal: "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe on
the rights of conscience." '5 9 Ames' recommendation was promptly passed by
the House committee.'
On September 3, 1789, the Senate met to consider the religion clauses sent
over by the House. 61 The Senate eliminated the clause dealing with the
rights of conscience, but failed to strike the free exercise clause or to
reformulate the entire amendment. 62 They met again on September 9 and
adopted a substantially narrower version of the House's proposal which
read: "Congress shall make no laws establishing articles of faith or a mode
of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of religion." 63 The Joint House
and Senate committee overcame the inherent conflict between the two versions in a compromise which yielded the language ultimately adopted
as the
6
establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment.
The actions of the First Congress and the proclamations of the early presidents revealed the limited extent to which the framers' believed the establish-

55. Id. at 201.
56. Id.; see also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 42 n.34 (1947) (Court interpreted

Huntington/Madison exchange as representative of Madison's belief that "no establishment"
meant no public financial support of religion).
57. T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 201-02 (1986).
58. See T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 202 (1986) (committee adopted Samuel
Livermore's proposal on August 15). Samuel Livermore's proposal was identical to the New

Hampshire state constitutional amendment. Id. at 203.
59. Id. at 209.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 206-07 (quoting the text of the Senate hearings from September 3).
62. See T. CURRY,THE FIRST FREEDOMS 206-07 (1986). The Senate rejected two alter-

native wordings which read: "Congress shall not make any law, infringing the rights of conscience, or establishing any Religious Sect or Society;" and "Congress shall make no law

establishing any particular denomination of religion in preference to another, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed." Id.
63. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 93-94 (1987) (Senate's intent was to prevent preeminence of any sect); T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 206-07
(1986) (quoting final Senate version).
64. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 94-96 (1987)
(Madison believed that six member joint committee had compromised House's language).
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ment clause should restrict state action touching religion. 65 Congress'
approval of a congressional chaplaincy, its enactment of the Northwest Or67
dinance, 66 the early presidents' issuance of national days of Thanksgiving,
President Jefferson's Treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians,68 and President
Madison's sanctioning of the state incorporation of churches69 indicated that
the founders recognized an acceptable federal role in encouraging religious
behavior. The federal government's favorable disposition toward religion
persisted in subsequent administrations which continued to make federal
grants for the benefit of religious organizations.7 °

IV.

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:

A

BURDENSOME LEGACY

A.

The Nineteenth Century

The Nineteenth Century Supreme Court understood the Bill of Rights to
restrict only federal government activity, and thus, a particular state's action
affecting church and state affairs was restricted only if an establishment

65. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 97-103 (1987)
(Congressional and Presidential acts revealed no inconsistency in fostering religious growth).
See generally Adams & Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559,
1581-86 (1989) (framers' acts, apparently inconsistent with establishment clause, may be attributable to their broad view of federalism). For example, Jefferson's and Madison's presidential proclamations, treaties, and other acts revealed an accomodating view of the government's
role in supporting religion. Id.
66. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 97-99 (1987)
(Northwest Ordinance, passed in 1789, provided federal funds to Catholic church for ministering to newly settled lands); R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 53 (1982)
(Madison played key role in creating chaplaincy system). But see Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 52 (1947)(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (Justice Rutledge believed framers' intent prohibited use of federal funds for religious training).
67. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 97-98 (1987)
(George Washington issued two Thanksgiving proclamations, John Adams issued two, and
Madison issued four); see also J. NOONAN, THE BELIEVERS AND THE POWERS THAT ARE
128-31 (1987) (quoting proclamations). Washington's and Adams' Thanksgiving proclamations each emphasized importance of faith in God to the success of the new nation. Id.; R.
CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 251-60 (1982) (reprinting proclamations issued
by Presidents Washington, Adams, and Jefferson).
68. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 100-01 (1987)
(1803 Kaskaskia Indian Treaty provided federal monies for support of Catholic priests and
building of a church). See generally R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 261-70
(1982) (reprinting Kaskaskia Indian Treaty).
69. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 101-02 (1987).
However, Madison vetoed an attempted church incorporation in Alexandria, Virginia. Id.
70. See, e.g., J. NOONAN, THE BELIEVERS AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 138 (1987)
(Congress granted land to Ohio Company in 1833 for support of religion, granted land in 1832
to a Baptist university, and granted land in 1833 to a Jesuit university).
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clause was written into the state's constitution.7 I The Court had no specific
opportunity to review the scope of the establishment clause in the first half of
the nineteenth century.72 Thus, religious minorities depended on state constitutions to protect their religious liberties.7 3 As a consequence, state courts
proved to be the forums which forged the meaning of the word "establishment" in controversies involving the state and religion.74
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Court heard a number of
cases which permitted it to comment on the meaning of the word "establishment.", 75 In 1872, the Court issued an opinion involving a church property
dispute which stated that "the law ...

is committed to the support of no

dogma, the establishment of no sect.", 76 In 1878 and 1890, the Court further

71. See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-48 (1833) (Chief Justice Marshall ruled that fifth amendment restricted only federal activity, not state); Permoli v. New
Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609-10 (1845) (first amendment religious clauses did not restrict state action); cf Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (Court first expressly
applied first amendment's establishment clause to states in 1947); Cantwell v Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (first application of free exercise clause to states); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (overturning Barron by applying first amendment to states through
fourteenth amendment); see also L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 122 (1986) (limitation of establishment clause to federal action permitted multiple state establishments of
religion).
72. While the early Supreme Court did not engage in detailed establishment clause analysis, it did address a number of controversies involving church and state issues. See, e.g.,
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 562-63 (1832) (reversing conviction of missionary
sentenced to four years imprisonment for unlicensed preaching); see also Vidal v. Girard's
Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 198 (1844) (Christian based common law of Pennsylvania
did not require express provision for teaching Christianity in testamentary creation of private
college); Terret v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 47 (1815) (Court addressed dispute over
lands belonging to Virginia's Episcopal Church as property dispute, not as establishment
clause case). But see Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 n.21 (Justice Black used Terret to support historical argument of Court's understanding of establishment clause).
73. See M. MARTY, PILGRIMS IN THEIR OwN LAND, 271-76 (1984) (religious minorities
depended on state constitutions because open persecution of minorities continued through first
half of the nineteenth century).
74. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206, 217 (1838) (blasphemy statute's implicit affirmation of Christianity was not an establishment of religion);
Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 488, 492 (1820) (Massachusetts constitutional provision permitted
local establishment of churches); Updegraph v. The Commonwealth, 26 Penn. (11 S.R.) 394,
400 (Pa. 1824) (blasphemy statute not an establishment of religion because part of historically
Christian common law); The People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 296 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (religious sanction implicit in blasphemy statute did not constitute establishment of religion).
75. See R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 120 (1982) (cases preceding
Everson did not provide basis for Justice Black's broad reading of establishment clause). See
generally Comment, Constitutional Fiction:An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Interpretation
of the Religion Clauses, 47 LA. L. REV. 169, 187-89 (1986) (Court's nineteenth century decisions did not support modern Court's approach).
76. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29 (1871) (Court did not apply establishment clause in resolving property dispute); cf Everson v. Board of Educ. 330 U.S. 1, 15

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol22/iss1/6

14

Bowen: Is Lemon a Lemon - Crosscurrents in Contemporary Establishment Cl

1990]

COMMENT

addressed the language of the religion clauses in two free exercise disputes
involving the practice of polygamy by Mormons.77 While holding in both
cases that the free exercise clause did not permit polygamy, the Court, in
dicta, explicated the language of the establishment clause.7 In Reynolds v.
UnitedStates, the Court introduced the "wall of separation" from Jefferson's
letter to the Danbury Baptist Convention, a metaphor that would ultimately
play a major role in shaping modem establishment clause jurisprudence.7 9
In Davis v. Beason, Justice Field amplified the Court's interpretation of the
word "establishment" when he wrote that "the First Amendment..., in
declaring that Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of
religion .... is intended.., to prohibit legislation for the support of any
religious tenets, or the modes of worship of any sect."' Finally, in 1899, the
Court ruled that federal funding for the building of a hospital run by
Catholics did not violate the establishment clause since the hospital was secularly incorporated."1
The nineteenth century closed without a clear understanding of the establishment clause's reach, primarily because the Court had chosen to avoid
addressing the issue directly.8 2 However, the Court's dicta did provide a
narrow framework for establishment clause interpretation, a framework that
reflected the framer's limited intentions, and one from which future Courts
would drastically depart.8 3

n.21 (1947) (Justice Black used Watson to support historical argument of Court's understanding of establishment clause).
77. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1890) (Court provided dicta as to meaning
of establishment clause); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (denying free
exercise claim in affirming conviction for polygamy).
78. Davis, 133 U.S. at 342; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
79. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. The Court used Jefferson's Bill for Religious Liberty,
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, and Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Connecticut
Baptist Association as a foundation for its interpretation. Id. at 162-64.
80. Davis, 133 U.S. at 342 (Court noted European legacy of oppression of diverse religious tenets or modes of worship provided reason for framers to create establishment clause).
81. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 299-300 (1899) (federal grants to secular corporations run by religious orders do not violate first amendment).
82. See G. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 11 (1987) (Court
sidestepped establishment clause issue in nineteenth century). See generally Comment, ConstitutionalFiction: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Interpretationof the Religion Clauses, 47
LA. L. REV. 169, 187-90 (1986) (reviewing nineteenth century Court decisions related to establishment clause).
83. See, e.g., Bradfield, 175 U.S. at 298-99 (Court avoided establishment clause issue by
restricting analysis to secular identity of incorporating parties); Church of the Holy Trinity v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457, 470-71 (1892) (Court avoided establishment clause issue, but
asserted Christian nature of America); Davis, 133 U.S. at 342 (free exercise issue but Court
provided dicta as to meaning of establishment clause); Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165-66 (denied free
exercise claim and thus no need to address establishment clause); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
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B. Early Twentieth Century Developments
During the first half of the Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court was
confronted more often with free exercise questions than with establishment
clause issues."4 Ironically, the case which most significantly affected establishment clause interpretation did not involve religion at all."5 In 1925, in
Gitlow v. New York, the Supreme Court abandoned one-hundred-and-thirtysix years of applying the Bill of Rights only to federal action by holding that
the first amendment applied to the states through the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.8 6 Fifteen years after Gitlow, the Court stated in
dicta that the religion clauses of the first amendment applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. 7 Finally, in 1947, the Court specifically held that the establishment clause restricted state action regarding
religion."
During this period, the Court dealt with two cases that explicitly broached
establishment clause issues, but in each case the Court used other theories to
achieve its result.8 9 In 1908, the Court avoided establishment clause analysis
by holding that federal funds held in trust to support Catholic education on
Wall.) 679, 734 (1871) (Court avoided establishment clause issue by focusing on property
dispute).
84. See, e.g., Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576-77 (1944) (exempting Jehovah's
Witnesses from tax on sale of books); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (interest in protecting child's safety outweighed child's right to street evangelization); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1943) (exempting itinerant evangelists from state tax); Board
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S, 624, 642 (1943) (religious beliefs valid grounds for not saluting
flag); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (applying free exercise clause to
states through fourteenth amendment to find protection for door-to-door evangelizing by Jehovah's Witnesses); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (Compulsory Education Act of 1922 violated parents right to send children to parochial schools). See generally R.
CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 98-99 (1982) (Compulsory Education Act required students to attend public schools from age eight to sixteen).
85. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (applying first amendment
through fourteenth amendment to invalidate state restriction on speech).
86. Id. Gitlow created the foundation for the incorporation of the Bill of Rights to apply
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
87. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 (applying free exercise clause to states through fourteenth amendment to permit door-to-door evangelizing by Jehovah's Witnesses). See generally
R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 99-101 (1982) (tracing process of applying
religion clauses to states through fourteenth amendment).
88. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (establishment clause applied
to state statute reimbursing students for school transportation costs). See generally Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 312-26 (1986) (Court's interpretation of
religion clauses since Everson manifestly inconsistent rendering its modem establishment
clause jurisprudence questionable).
89. See Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1930) (buying books for parochial school constitutional because part of state police power to further education); Reuben
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an Indian reservation did not violate the establishment clause."° In 1930,
the Court upheld a Louisiana statute which allowed the state to purchase
books for parochial schools.91 The Court stated that the program fell within
the scope of the states' police powers, and thereby avoided the implicit establishment clause controversy. 9 ' The Court's failure to define, prior to 1947,
the precise meaning of the word establishment burdened
the modem Court
with the difficult task of uncovering that meaning. 93
C.

Everson and its Progeny

In Everson v. Board of Education, the Court finally addressed the precise
meaning of the words "an establishment of religion." 94 The case involved a
challenge to a New Jersey program that reimbursed transportation expenses
to the parents of children attending parochial schools.95 Justice Black's majority opinion and Justice Rutledge's dissent delved into the foundations of
the framers' understanding of the establishment clause's intended effect. 96
The majority paradoxically affirmed the state program while maintaining
that the "wall of separation" between church and state must be "high and
impregnable."9 7 Everson's conflicting rationale engendered a line of deciQuick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 82 (1908) (funds used to support Catholic education on
reservation constitutional because not directly appropriated by Congress).
90. See Reuben Quick Bear, 210 U.S. at 82 (funds used to support Catholic education on
reservation not directly appropriated by Congress for religious purposes).
91. See Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 374-75 (1930) (buying books with state
funds for parochial school does not violate establishment clause).
92. Id.
93. See R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 108 (1982) (cases prior to Everson ultimately of little value in determining what action establishment clause prohibited).
94. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 29 (1947)(Rutledge, J., dissenting) (Justice
Rutledge acknowledged that Court could no longer avoid the issue of establishment clause's

meaning).
95. Id. at 3 (state program reimbursed costs of transportation to parochial school through
tax deduction).
96. See id. at 16, 33-41 (Justice Black relied ultimately on Jefferson's "wall of separation," while Justice Rutledge focused on Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance); see also
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing Everson's historical analysis). In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist wrote:
[t]he Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years. Thomas Jefferson was of course in France at the time the constitutional Amendments known as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress and ratified by
the States. His letter to the Danbury Baptist Association was a short note of courtesy,
written 14 years after the Amendments were passed by Congress. He would seem to any
detached observer as a less than ideal source of contemporary history as to the meaning of
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
Id.
97. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson highlighted the
discordant tone of the result, noting that permitting the state reimbursement program to help
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sions characterized by contradictory results.9"
The uncertain proportions of the "wall of separation" became evident in
the Court's next two establishment clause decisions.9 9 In the first case, the
Court held that releasing students from class for religious instruction on
school grounds violated the establishment clause."o° In the second, however, it permitted released-time programs for religious instruction conducted

off campus." ° The Court again chose to accommodate religion in 1961
when it upheld the constitutionality of state Sunday closing laws."2 However, the Court limited its accommodating approach the following year
when it struck down a New York statute calling for the recitation of a nondenominational prayer at the start of the school day."13

students of all private schools, including parochial schools, indicated that the "wall" had a
limited reach. Id.
98. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, - U.S. _, - 110 S.
Ct. 688, 698, 107 L. Ed. 2d 796, 811 (1990) (holding inconsistent with Follett v. McCormick,
321 U.S. 573 (944), and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), which permitted
exemptions from state license tax); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, - U.S. -,
109 S. Ct.
3086, 3115-16, 106 L. Ed. 2d 472, 510-11 (holding inconsistent with Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984), which permitted the display of a creche); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
U.S. ., 109 S. Ct. 890, 905, 105 L. Ed. 2d 1, 25 (1989) (holding inconsistent with Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), which permitted property tax exemptions for religious
organizations); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68-9 (1985) (holding inconsistent with Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), which permitted state sanctioned prayer in legislature); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254-55 (1977) (holding inconsistent with Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349 (1975), which denied any state support for counseling of private school students);
School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 391-92 (1985) (holding inconsistent with Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), which permitted tax exemptions to private school students).
99. Compare McCollum v Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1948) (released time for
religious instruction in school classrooms unconstitutionally breached "wall of separation")
with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (statute allowing students released time from
school for religious education not violative of establishment clause). In Zorach, Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, affirmed the Everson and McCollum constitutional standard of
separation between church and state, but recognized rational limits defined by the religious
nature of American culture. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312-15. Justices Black and Frankfurter dissented stating that Zorach overturned McCollum. Id. at 315-23.
100. See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212 (Court affirmed Everson's "wall of separation" noting that program permitting student released time for religious education on school property
impermissibly aided religion).
101. See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 315 (Court limited "wall" by saying that separation between
church and state did not prohibit released time for religious education off campus). Justice
Douglas' majority opinion in Zorach more accurately reflected the framers' intent because it
focused on the government's responsibility not to favor one particular sect over others. Id. at
313-14.
102. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449 (1961) (Court broadened interpretation of establishment clause to permit ostensibly religious legislation on issues secularized by
historical tradition). Chief Justice Earl Warren noted that state Sunday closing laws did not
violate the establishment clause, because the statutes had lost their religious nature. Id.
103. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (if law appears to implicitly establish
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The Court adopted its first elemental test for use in establishment clause
analysis in 1963, a test that proved to be the precursor of the now operative
Lemon test." 4 According to this test, a law could withstand constitutional
scrutiny only if it had a secular purpose and had the effect of neither advancing nor inhibiting religion."0 5 By adopting this "purpose/effect test," the
Court abandoned the view that the establishment clause was intended
merely to restrict state preference of one religion over others. 0 6 The Court
subsequently applied the "purpose/effect test" to strike down a statute
prohibiting public schools from teaching evolution,"0 7 and to uphold a statute requiring public schools to lend secular textbooks to private schools."08
In 1970, the Court reformulated the "purpose/effect test" by replacing the
effects prong with a requirement that state action avoid excessive entanglements with religion.° 9 In applying the "purpose/entanglements test" to uphold tax exemptions for church-owned real property, the Court adopted a
more accommodating stance toward religion characterized by a "benevolent
neutrality." 0 This new test permitted the Court more flexibility in applying the establishment clause because questions of church and state entangle-

religion, then establishment clause violated). Even though students were not required to participate, law requiring recitation of prayer did not survive establishment clause scrutiny. Id.
104. School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221-22 (1963). The Court
applied this test to find that Bible reading as part of a public school exercise violated the
estabishment clause. Id. at 226-27. See generally R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND

STATE 147-48 (1982) (government violates establishment clause when it conducts religious
ceremonies).
105. See Abington, 374 U.S. at 221-22 (Court used historical analysis to justify adoption
of two part "purpose/effect test" which Court believed would accurately ensure government
neutrality).
106. See id. at 309 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (Justice Stewart criticized "wall of separation"
analysis as doctrinaire and antithetical to framers' intent).
107. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) (government must be neutral
toward religion and not be hostile to religion or irreligion). The Court held that the statute
clearly violated the purpose prong of the "purpose/effect test." Id. at 107.
108. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (legislative purpose to
provide educational benefits to students was secular and effect did not advance religion); cf.
Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370, 374-375 (1930) (buying books for parochial school
part of state police power to further education). But see Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 25054 (1977) (upholding loan of books and provision of services to parochial schools, but invalidating loans of other educational materials); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1975)
(provision of instructional materials, such as maps, to parochial schools unconstitutional).
109. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 674-675 (1970) (Court created excessive
governmental entanglements prong).
110. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 669 (taxing religious organizations would excessively entangle
church and state activity). In Walz, the Court emphasized the importance of government
neutrality toward religion regarding taxation. Id. at 669-70. But see Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock - U.S. _ _ 109 S. Ct. 890, 905, 103 L. Ed. 2d 7, 20 (1989) (Court held tax exemptions for religious publications violated establishment clause).
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ments inherently hinge on questions of degree."I The Court's newly refined
approach predisposed it to an establishment clause analysis designed to ensure that no religion would be favored, commanded, or inhibited." 2
The Court's flexible predisposition was short-lived. For in Lemon v.
Kurtzman," 3 the Court synthesized the "purpose/effect" and the "purpose/entanglements" tests to create a new three-pronged test which ulti-

mately would serve as the touchstone for resolving all subsequent
establishment clause controversies.I"' In Lemon, the Court reintroduced the
effects prong to balance the subjectivity inherent in the entanglements
prong.' ' The Court applied this new test to invalidate state programs
which provided salary supplements to all private school teachers, including
those at parochial schools, reasoning that such programs, while secular in
16
purpose, ultimately created excessive church and state entanglements.
The Court argued that this entanglement could cause the kind of political
divisiveness
which the framers' intended to obviate with the establishment
7
clause. 1

The Court subsequently used the Lemon test to strike down programs
which provided tuition reimbursement to private school students," 8I and
programs which required public schools to loan instructional materials to
private schools. 19 Additionally, the Court applied Lemon to uphold federal
grants to religiously affiliated institutions of higher learning. 120 However,
111. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 674 (Court stated entanglements test must be necessarily flexible). See generally, Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 2, 18 (1978-79) (criticizing Walz's
upholding of tax exemption as fundamentally contradicting purpose prong).
112. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
113. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
114. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (Court's problem with ambiguity
of word "respecting" in establishment clause created need for concrete test).
115. See id. at 614-15 (examining entanglements test). The entanglements test is inherently subjective because it involves examining the "relationship between government and religious authority" on a case-by-case basis. Id.
116. Id. at 624-25 (using entanglements prong to invalidate school funding program).
The Court distinguished Lemon from Walz by holding that the establishment clause question
in Lemon was based on an innovative school funding program, while the tax exemptions in
Walz were based on an historically accepted policy of granting such exemptions to religious
organizations. Id.
117. Id. at 622 (Court believed it politically necessary to ensure that religion clauses do
not cause divisiveness).
118. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 (1973) (invalidation of
tuition tax grants and credits to parents of private school children). But see Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1983) (upholding tax deductions for private education).
119. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248 (1977) (invalidating program of loaning
instructional materials to parochial schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372-73 (1975)
(providing materials such as maps to parochial schools ruled unconstitutional).
120. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 745 (1976) (Court upheld
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problems in applying the Lemon test began to appear when the Court
handed down conflicting opinions regarding the reimbursement of private
schools for administering state-mandated tests, 12 1 and the public funding of
counseling services at private schools.12 2
The 1980's brought the Supreme Court an ever increasing number of establishment clause cases, many of which questioned the effectiveness of the
Lemon test as an analytical tool.123 In its first establishment clause case of
the new decade, the Court affirmed and expanded the right of private schools
to be reimbursed for state-mandated testing.1 24 The Court noted that the
unpredictability of establishment clause decisions resulted from persistent
difficulties in effectively applying the clause through the Lemon test. 25 That
same year the Court struck down a statute requiring the display of the Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms by ruling that the statute did
not have a secular purpose.' 26 Two years later, the Court affirmed the vitality of the Lemon test by using it to strike down a state law that permitted
churches to veto pending liquor licenses if the applying business was within
500 feet of the church.127 However, commitment to the Lemon test faltered

grant program to private colleges where money used for secular purposes); see also Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741-43 (1973) (Court upheld state bond program for private college
construction as long as school not pervasively sectarian); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
679-81 (1971) (grants to universities upheld as long as religion did not permeate schools).
121. Compare Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1977) (allowing state counseling
of private school students away from parochial school) with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
371-73 (1975) (denying state funded guidance counseling for students on parochial school
grounds). In Meek, the Court upheld Allen's legacy of permitting the loan of textbooks to
parochial schools, but denied the constitutionality of loaning instructional materials such as
maps. Meek, 421 U.S. at 373.
122. Compare Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1977) (upholding reimbursement
for state-mandated testing) with Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 482 (1973)
(denying reimbursement for administering of both state-mandated and teacher-created tests).
123. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, - U.S. -, -, 109 S. Ct. 890, 909, 103 L.
Ed. 2d 1, 25-32 (1989)(Scalia, J., dissenting) (use of Lemon to deny tax exemption not founded
on Constitution, precedent, or history); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639-40 (1987)
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (criticizing inconsistent application of Lemon test); Aguilar v. Felton,
473 U.S. 402, 419 (1985) (Lemon criteria too formalistic); Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 112
(1985)(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Lemon test blurred and indistinct); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (Lemon test not overriding criteria); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,
394 (1983) (Lemon test nothing but helpful signpost); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 79295 (1983) (ignored Lemon in favor of historical argument).
124. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980). Justice White's
majority opinion stated that until the Court developed an encompassing construction of the
establishment clause, flexibility was preferable to strict predictability. Id.
125. Id.
126. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 56 (1980).
127. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982) (permitting churches
veto power over civil licensing created excessive church and state entanglements).
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over the next two years. The Court ignored the Lemon test in permitting a
state legislature to open each day with prayer,' 2 ' questioned the test in upholding tuition tax credits for private school students, 29 and loosely applied
the test in finding that30a publicly displayed nativity scene did not violate the
establishment clause.'
Despite its inconsistent application, the Court revived its faith in the
Lemon test in 1985, when it used the test to invalidate a state "moment-ofsilence" statute,"' and to strike down two programs funding state teachers
who gave remedial instruction in parochial schools.' 3 2 In 1987, the Court
reaffirmed Lemon's viability by applying it to invalidate a state statute which
called for33 the balanced treatment of evolution and creation science in
schools.'
V.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: A DIVISION OF FAITH

Since 1987, the Supreme Court has applied the Lemon test to uphold pro13
grams that funded religious organizations offering adolescent counseling, 1
to invalidate religious-based tax exemptions,13 to enjoin the display of a

128. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (historical tradition permitted

practice of opening state legislature with prayer to pass constitutional muster); cf McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 441-45 (1961) (Court broadened interpretation of establishment

clause to permit ostensibly religious legislation on issues that have become secularized by historical tradition).
129. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.11 (1983). The Court noted that the test
provides "no more than a helpful signpost in dealing with establishment clause challenges."

Id. at 394.
130. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984) (historical tradition of creche
display enabled it to survive constitutional scrutiny). The Court weakened the Lemon test
emphasizing that it refused to be confined by any overriding criteria. Id. at 679.
131. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985). The Court used Lemon's purpose
prong to strike down a school prayer statute which endorsed religion. Id. However, four
Justices found the Lemon test inadequate and formalistically restrictive. Id. at 89-105.
132. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1985) (financial subsidy to public school
teachers teaching in parochial schools violative of excessive entanglements prong). Four Justices in Aguilar dissented, objecting to the formalistic analysis compelled by Lemon. Id. at
419-22; see also School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397-98 (1985) (held program granting
subsidy to state teachers for teaching in parochial school unconstitutional because it endorsed
religion and violated effects prong).
133. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (invalidated "balanced treatment" statute as violative of purpose prong because the statute endorsed religion); cf. County
109 S. Ct. 3086, 3100, 106 L. Ed. 2d 472, 494 (1989)
of Allegheny v. ACLU, - U.S. - (Court noted that whether state action endorsed religion was essential to resolving constitutional issue).
134. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 622 (1988) (grants to religious organizations providing adolescent counseling not violative of establishment clause).
110 S.Ct.
135. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, - U.S.
688, 698, 107 L. Ed. 2d 796, 815 (1990) (religious organization not exempt from state sales and
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nativity scene in a county courthouse, 136 and to allow extracurricular bible
clubs to meet in public schools. 137 While putatively adhering to the Lemon
test, the Court instead has emphasized state neutrality towards religion by
expanding the test's "effects prong."1 3' This has led the Court to use
Lemon as a means to discern
whether suspect government action caused an
"endorsement of religion." 139
A.

Bowen v. Kendrick: The Establishment Clause and Counseling
Services

In Bowen v. Kendrick, " the Court applied the Lemon test to find that the
Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA)"4 ' did not violate the establishment
clause.' 42 Although the Act provided funding for religiously affiliated counseling organizations, the Court held that the overall program had a valid
secular purpose.1 4 3 The Court also concluded that the program did not aduse taxes); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, - U.S. _, _ 109 S.Ct. 890, 905, 103 L. Ed. 2d 1,
20 (1989) (state tax exemptions for religious publications violated establishment clause).
136. See County of Allegheny, - U.S. at _, 109 S. Ct. at 3115, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 511-12
(display of creche violated establishment clause, but menorah and Christmas tree display did
not).
137. See Board of Education v. Mergens,

-

U.S.

110 S. Ct. 2356, 2373, 110 L. Ed.

2d 191, 218 (1990) (Equal Access Act grants religious clubs access to public school extracurricular program).
138. See, e.g., Mergens, - U.S. at - 110 S. Ct. at 2373, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 218 (neutrality
of Equal Access Act permitted Bible clubs to meet at public school); County of Allegheny, U.S. at _ 109 S. Ct. at 3115, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 511-12 (creche display not neutral because had
effect of advancing Christianity); Bowen, 487 U.S. at 622 (Adolescent Family Life Act facially
neutral, thus no effect of advancing religion).
139. See, e.g., County ofAllegheny, - U.S. at , 109 S. Ct. at 3121, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 51617 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (using "endorsement test" to find creche display violative of
establishment clause); Texas Monthly, Inc, - U.S. at - 109 S.Ct. at 896, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 9
(establishment clause at least prevents governmental "endorsement" of one religion over
others); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (purpose of creationism statute was
"endorsement" of religion); Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348-49
(1987) (O'Connor, concurring) (free exercise benefits to religion do not operate as "endorsement of religion"); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 391-92 (1985) (educational program
providing private school students benefits at public expense constituted "endorsement of religion"); Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Court should
objectively examine legislative history and text, as well as statute's implementation to find
"endorsement"). But see County of Allegheny, - U.S. at , 109 S.Ct. at 3141, 106 L. Ed.2d
at 544-45 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("endorsement test" unworkable refinement of Lemon).
140. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). The Court found that grants to religious
organizations which provide adolescent counseling did not violate the establishment clause.

Id.
141. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300z (West Supp. 1988) (codifying the Adolescent Family Life
Act). Adolescent Family Life Act provided for counseling on adolescent sexual behavior. Id.
142. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 617-18.
143. Id.
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vance religion, because the challenged recipients were not pervasively sectarian nor did they use the funds to promote religious activities. 1" The Court
weakened Lemon by strongly criticizing the continued use of the "excessive
entanglements prong" as unworkable.145
B.

Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock- Religious Based Tax Exemptions
Questioned

While nominally invoking the Lemon test in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 1" a plurality of the Court found that state-mandated tax exemptions
for religious publications violated the establishment clause.147 The Court
rejected the claim that the exemption was merely a benefit incidental to free
exercise rights. 4 ' Instead, the Court ruled that the statute's purpose effected an endorsement of religion over non-religion because the exemption
only applied to religious publications.1 49 The dissent argued that the majority had ignored the substantial precedent which supported religious tax exemptions as essential to protecting free exercise rights.1 50
C. County of Allegheny v. ACLU: The State and Religious Displays
In County of Allegheny v. A CL U,1 5 a deeply divided Court enjoined the
display of a nativity scene on public property by ruling that the display effected an endorsement of Christian doctrine.1" 2 However, the Court also
144. See id. at 616 (mere religious affiliation of recipient does not disqualify organization
from federal grant program).
145. See id. at 615-16 (cited history of problems excessive entanglement prong had
presented). The subjective nature of the entanglements prong creates inherent problems in its
application. Id. But see id. at 649-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (entanglements prong necessary to find whether impermissible governmental monitoring would be required).
146. - U.S. _, 109 S. Ct. 890, 103 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989).
147. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, - U.S. -, -, 109 S. Ct. 890, 905, 103 L. Ed.

2d 1, 20 (1989) (tax exemption for religious publications violative of establishment clause).
148. Id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 901, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 15.
149. See id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 900-01, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 14 (taxing religious publications
does not hinder free exercise rights); cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-59 (1982)
(overriding governmental interest permitted taxing of Amish employer for social security).
But see Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970) (taxing church property would burden
free exercise rights); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 581-82 (1944) (license tax on religious booksellers burdened free exercise); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112-13
(1943) (license tax on door-to-door evangelists burdened free exercise).
150. See Texas Monthly, Inc., - U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 909, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 25 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (denying tax exemption not founded on Constitution, precedent, or history).
151. - U.S. _, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 106 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1989).
152. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, - U.S. - -, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3100-01, 106 L.
Ed. 2d 472, 494-95 (1989) (endorsement means favoring or promoting religion). But see Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (display of creche scene on public property not impermissible endorsement of religion). The Court distinguished the Lynch and the County of Alle-
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ruled that the display of an eighteen-foot menorah next to a Christmas tree
was constitutionally acceptable as an acknowledgment of the diversity of
holiday traditions.15 3 In separate opinions, Justices Brennan and Stevens
concurred with the majority regarding the nativity scene, but dissented as to
the Menorah and Christmas tree display, because they believed that it impermissibly favored religion over non-religion.' 54
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy asserted that proper application of the
Lemon test supported the constitutionality of both the nativity scene and the
Menorah and Christmas tree display.' 5" He argued that the contradictory
result reached by the Court in County ofAllegheny indicated that the Lemon
test needed thorough revision. 15 6 Justice Kennedy believed that Lemon had
created an unjustifiable hostility towards religion which produced a decision
that ignored both legal precedent and the Court's historical acceptance of
religiously oriented holiday displays.' 57

gheny displays by their respective physical composition. See County of Allegheny, - U.S. at
109 S. Ct. at 3103-04, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 497-99. The Lynch display had a creche, a Santa,
and a talking wishing well, while the County of Allegheny display had only a creche scene
prominently displayed. Id.
153. See County of Allegheny, - U.S. at - 109 S. Ct. at 3114, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 510
(combination display of Christmas tree and menorah simply symbolized alternative traditions).
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that the test was whether a reasonable observer
was sufficiently likely to find the menorah and Christmas tree display significantly religious.
Id. at _ 109 S. Ct. at 3114-15, 106 L. Ed.2d at 543-44. See generally Note, Leading Cases,
103 HARV. L. REv. 137, 234-37 (1989) (attacking "reasonable observer" test as inconsistent
with constitutional analysis and flawed because it permits Justices to inject own values). The
Court's adoption of the "endorsement" test will cause unpredictability in future establishment
clause cases. Id. at 239.; Marshall, 'We Know It When We See It: The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 495, 537 (1986) ("reasonable observer" test unworkable).
154. See County of Allegheny, - U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 3124, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 523
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (menorah and Christmas tree display
conveyed religious message). The Court voted six-to-three to uphold the display of the menorah, and voted five-to-four to enjoin the creche display. Id.
155. See County of Allegheny, - U.S. at .., 109 S. Ct. at 3134, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 550
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (display of creche did not have primary effect of advancing religion). Justice Kennedy lamented the ascendancy of the endorsement test, and criticized it as unworkable in practice. Id. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 3134, 106 L. Ed.
2d at 544. Justice Kennedy advocated a coercion test that would enjoin displays only if they
compelled the establishment of a particular religion. Id. at - 109 S. Ct. at 3136-37, 106 L.
Ed. 2d at 538-39 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See Note, Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REv. 137,
234-37 (1989) (endorsement test flawed because of inherent subjectivity yielding inconsistent
decisions).
156. County ofAllegheny, - U.S. at _. 109 S. Ct. at 3134, 106 L.Ed. 2d at 535 (Justice
Kennedy stated that Lemon test needed complete revision).
157. See id. at .. _, 109 S. Ct. at 3134, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 535 (precedent and history support

toleration of traditional religious displays); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675-77
(1984) (recognizing historical validity of religious content in many state activities); Marsh v.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

25

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 22 [2022], No. 1, Art. 6

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:129

D. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization: More on
Religion and Taxes
In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization,"58 a surprisingly
unanimous Court uncritically applied the standard Lemon three-pronged
analysis to find that a religious organization was not exempt from paying
state sales and use taxes.159 The majority focused its Lemon analysis on the
entanglements prong, and noted that the statute requiring religious organizations to comply with state accounting procedures did not cause an excessive
enmeshing of religious and governmental affairs." 6 In applying the establishment clause, the Court factually distinguished Swaggart from Texas
Monthly, stating that the statute addressed16 in
Texas Monthly qualitatively
1
differed from the one at issue in Swaggart.
E. Board of Education v. Mergens: Status Quo Ante
In its most recent establishment clause decision, the Supreme Court, by a
vote of eight to one, found that the Equal Access Act constitutionally permitted extracurricular religious clubs to meet at public schools.' 62 Writing
for the majority, Justice O'Connor parenthetically invoked Lemon to uphold
the constitutionality of public school bible clubs as long as they were part of
a broader extracurricular program.163 While implicitly affirming the continued viability of Lemon as a decision-making tool, Justice O'Connor avoided
extended analysis of the test, choosing instead to scrutinize the facial validity
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (historical tradition permitted prayer in legislature to
survive establishment clause scrutiny).
158. - U.S. - 110 S. Ct. 688, 107 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1990).
159. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization,

-

U.S ....

110 S. Ct.

688, 699, 107 L. Ed. 2d 796, 814 (1990) (state tax statute had secular purpose, did not advance
or inhibit religion, and created no excessive entanglements). The Court concluded there was
not an excessive burden on free exercise rights caused by the sales and use tax. Id. at , 110 S.
Ct. at 692-97, 107 L. Ed. 2d at 811. See Hernandez v. Commissioner,

-,

U.S.

-,

.

109 S.

Ct. 2136, 2149, 104 L. Ed. 2d 766, 785 (1989) (disallowing tax deduction for training and
auditing costs claimed as burdensome to free exercise by religious organization). But see Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 582-83 (1944) (license tax on religious booksellers burdened
free exercise); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943) (license tax on door-to-door
evangelists burdened free exercise).
160. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, - U.S. at - 110 S. Ct. at 699, 107 L. Ed. 2d at 812
(more government invasion required before excessive entanglements occur).
161. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 695, 107 L. Ed. 2d at 809 (Court explicitly refused to revisit
particular establishment clause issues raised in Texas Monthly). Justice O'Connor briefly
noted that the facts in Swaggart so differed from those in Texas Monthly that the Court did not
have to rely on Texas Monthly in striking down the Swaggart Ministries tax exemption. Id.
162. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2373, 110 L. Ed. 2d
191, 218 (1990) (Court recognized that permitting such clubs did not cause unconstitutional
entanglement of religion and state).
163. Id.
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of the Equal Access Act.'
VI.

A

PROPOSED REFORMULATION: PURPOSE AS SUBSTANCE

The United States Supreme Court's recent decisions indicate that modern
establishment clause jurisprudence is in disarray. 65 The inherent weaknesses of the Lemon test became apparent in the inconsistent results the test
produced in cases with relatively similar facts and issues.' 66 The Court's
judicial refinements of Lemon, most notably the "endorsement test," have
served only to accentuate Lemon's weaknesses. 67 Despite the analytical

164. See id. at ., 110 S. Ct. at 2370-71, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 214-15 (use of Lemon, while
cursory, helped validate test's continuing viability).
165. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, - U.S.
109 S. Ct. 3086, 3134, 106 L. Ed.
2d 472, 535 (1989)(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Justice Kennedy
recognized need for substantial revision of establishment clause jurisprudence); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985)(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Justice Rehnquist criticized Everson's
faulty historical analysis). See generally Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CoNN. L.
REv. 701, 701-12 (1986) (examining various reasons for confusion in establishment clause
jurisprudence); Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in FirstAmendment Religious Doctrine, 72
CALIF. L. REV. 817, 839 (1984) (modem establishment clause jurisprudence is a doctrinal
mess).
166. The Court has encountered conflict in the area of taxation of religious organizations.
Compare Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, - U.S. -, -, 110 S. Ct. 688,
695-96, 699, 107 L. Ed. 2d 796, 814 (1990) (state tax statute had secular purpose, did not
advance or inhibit religion, and created no excessive entanglements) with Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 582-83 (1944) (license tax on religious booksellers burdened free exercise)
and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943) (license tax on door-to-door evangelists burdened free exercise). Compare Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, - U.S. _, _, 109 S.
Ct. 890, 905, 103 L. Ed. 2d 1, 20 (1989) (tax exemption for religious publications violative of
establishment clause) with Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970) (taxing church
property does not burden right to free exercise of religion). The Court has also handed down
contradictory decisons regarding religious displays on public property. Compare County of
Allegheny, -. U.S. at -.., 109 S. Ct. at 3115-16, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 512 (display of creche violated
establishment clause, but menorah and Christmas tree display did not) with Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (display of creche scene on public property not impermissible
endorsement of religion). The problem of public prayer has also caused conflict. Compare
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68-69 (invalidating prayer in public schools) with Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (permitted statute requiring legislative prayer). The use of school
facilities within a "religious" context has presented contradictions in Court decisions. Compare Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248 (1977) (allowing state counseling of private school
students away from parochial school) with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (denying state guidance counseling for students on parochial school grounds).
167. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639 n.7 (1987)(Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing inconsistencies Lemon and progeny have yielded); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 42930 (1985XO'Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing "entanglements prong"); Wallace, 472 U.S. at
107 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Lemon provides blurred and indistinct test); Roemer v.
Maryland Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J. concurring) (Lemon "entanglements prong" creates unworkable paradox); Meek, 421 U.S. at 359 (Lemon provides only general guidelines); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 799 (1973) (Burger, C.J.,
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quandary created by the Lemon test, the Court has refused to engage in any
wholesale reformulation of the test's elemental framework.1 68 The Court
has not revised its approach probably because of the substantial precedent
that supports the application of the Lemon test to establishment clause controversies.169 However, the Court's cautious adherence to Lemon ignores
the contradictory results the test has produced. 7 '
The Court has built its modem establishment clause jurisprudence upon
an interpretation of the framer's original understanding of the words "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."''7 Beginning with Everso2, the Court believed that proper application of the
establishment clause depended on accurately discovering this original understanding. 77 Thus, from the start, the modern Court took a distinctively
originalist approach to resolving contemporary establishment clause contro-

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Lemon test is merely useful signpost). See generally
Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment Clause:
The UntappedPotentialof Justice O'Connor'sInsight, 64 N.C.L. REv. 1049, 1051 (1986) (endorsement test focuses on impact of religiously related state action on non-believer).
168. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries,- U.S. at , 110 S. Ct. at 697-98, 107 L. Ed.
2d at 811-12 (applied standard three-pronged Lemon test); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589,
615-18 (1988) (Court applied Lemon to uphold grants to religious organizations providing
adolescent counseling); School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382-83 (1985) (Lemon should guide
establishment clause inquiries); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 61 (applied Lemon to strike school prayer
statute); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684-85 (applied Lemon to uphold creche display); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (Lemon test must be starting point for all establishment clause analysis);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981) (used Lemon to permit equal access to school for
religious speakers).
169. See County of Allegheny, - U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 3145-46, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 543
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (Justice Kennedy believed proper application of Lemon test should
have permitted display of creche scene). Justice Kennedy paradoxically criticized Lemon, then
accepted its use in this case, and then used an historically based argument to support display of
the creche. Id. at _, 109 S.Ct. at 3134-40, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 535-43.
170. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries,- U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 698, 107 L. Ed. 2d
at 811 (holding inconsistent with Follett and Murdock which permitted exemptions from state
license tax); County ofAllegheny, - U.S. at - 109 S. Ct. at 3115-16, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 510-11
(holding inconsistent with Lynch which permitted display of creche); Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, - U.S.., -, 109 S. Ct. 890, 905, 105 L. Ed. 2d 1, 25 (1989) (holding inconsistent
with Walz which permitted property tax exemptions for religious organizations); Wallace, 472
U.S. at 68-69 (holding inconsistent with Marsh which permitted state sanctioned prayer in
legislature); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250-55 (1977) (holding inconsistent with Meek
which denied any state support for counseling of private school students); Ball, 473 U.S. at
389-92 (holding inconsistent with Mueller which permitted tax exemptions to private school
students).
171. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl.
1.
172. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1947) (Court recounted series of
historical events, documents, and personalities to support meaning of establishment clause).
In his dissent, Justice Rutledge closely examined Madison's writings in an attempt to discover
the meaning of the establishment clause. Id. at 31-41.
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versies. "' However, the Everson Court's desire to implement a specific policy resulted in a narrow historical analysis wherein the Court appropriated

only those sources that supported its policy.17 4 The Court's adoption of
Thomas Jefferson's metaphorical "wall of separation" as the guiding symbol
for proper church and state relations set the tone for subsequent establishment clause decisions."' If the Court had expanded its historical analyses
to include the views of the other framers, it would have found them distinctly non-Jeffersonian, and a substantially different approach may have
resulted. 176
Any evaluation of the establishment clause should begin with a scrupulous
review of the House and Senate committee debates that led to the clause's
creation.' 7 7 Those debates provide the most persuasive evidence regarding

173. See id. at 12-13 (Court focused only on Madison's and Jefferson's writings to derive
establishment clause's original meaning). See generally Hitchcock, The Supreme Court and
Religion: HistoricalOverview andFuturePrognosis,24 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 183, 201 (1980) (Court
implicitly incorporated Jeffersonian notion that state needed protection from contamination of
religion).
174. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16 (Justice Black sought to use the limited available
precedent to support his strict separationist approach). See generally Bradley, Dogmatomachy
- A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion Cases, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 275, 287-88 (1986) (propagation of policy goals, not historical reliance, basis for Court's establishment clause rulings).
The Court's policy has resulted in removal of religious consciousness from the public sphere.
Id. at 280; cf Giannella,Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,and DoctrinalDevelopment: Part
II. The NonestablishmentPrinciple, 81 HARV. L. REv. 513, 514-15 (1968) (Court's separationist policy has frustrated original purpose of establishment clause).
175. See Bradley, Church Autonomy in the ConstitutionalOrder: The End of Church and
State?, 49 LA. L. REv. 1057, 1057-59 (Everson made the "wall of separation" part of our
cultural fabric). Professor Bradley quoted candidate George Bush from a speech he made in
1988:
Was I scared floating around in a little yellow raft off the coast of an enemy-held island,
setting a world record for paddling? Of course I was. What sustains you in times like
that? Well you go back to fundamental values. I thought about Mother and Dad and the
strength I got from them--and God and faith and the separation of Church and State.
Id. at 1057 (emphasis added); Merel, The Protection of IndividualChoice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805, 810 (1978) (Court
has focused on separating church and state, while objective of religion clauses is to promote
religious liberty).
176. See J. EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 339-42 (1987) (majority
of framers' were committed men of faith; Madison was an enigma, and Jefferson was a Deist
who became a Unitarian).
177. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98-99 (1985)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (establishment clause can only be understood through framers' original intentions which Everson
misread). See generally Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling
the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 673, 674-5 (1980) (framers intended clauses to complement
one another, but Court's separate tests have caused irreconcilable tension between them).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

29

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 22 [2022], No. 1, Art. 6

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 22:129

the meaning of the words "establishment of religion."'17 1 The specific language used at these debates by Housemembers James Madison, Elbridge
Gerry, Benjamin Huntington, Fisher Ames, and the participating Senators
provides the most explicit insight into what the framers understood the establishment clause to mean.' 7 9 Additionally, the acts of the First Congress,
and the practices of the early presidents, many of whom were also framers of
the Constitution, substantiate further what effect the framers' intended the
80
establishment clause to have.'
A viable reformulation of the Lemon test, loyal to the language and actions of the framers, would provide that state action must not have as its
purpose the favoring, compelling, or mandating of any article of religious
faith, any mode of religious worship, or any denominational doctrine.""'
This alternative is a purpose-based test which comports with the framers'
understanding of the establishment clause as revealed by the congressional
debates and early federal action regarding religion. The proposed test would
invalidate government action whose purpose supported the propagation of
religion, but would permit such action that incidentally benefited religious
organizations.I8 2 Specifically, the proposed test would prevent states from
sponsoring public displays favoring a particular religion or from compelling

178. See T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 200-07 (1986) (reprinting critical excerpts
from House and Senate committee hearings on establishment clause).
179. See T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 200 (1986) (framers sought to restrict federal
establishments of religion, not to exclude religion from state matters altogether). The framers
of the establishment clause were concerned about the federal government favoring a particular
denomination, doctrine, or mode of worship over others. Id.
180. See R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 45 (1982) (Congress and early
presidents enacted numerous treaties and legislation that funded various missionary
enterprises).
181. See T. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS 200-09 (1986) (providing alternative House

and Senate committee formulations). Elbridge Gerry's proposal stated that "no religious doctrine shall be established by law." Id. at 200. Gerry was from Massachusetts, as was Fisher
Ames, whose final formulation became the establishment clause; thus, Gerry's and Ames' common background makes the former's suggestion critically important to understanding what
Ames intended with his formulation. Id. at 202, 209. See id. at 207 (Senate version read:
"Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship .... ). The
Senate debate more clearly defined what "establishment of religion" meant by identifying those
religious areas that the state could not touch. Id.
182. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 622 (1988) (proposed test would uphold,
as Lemon did here, programs that incidentally benefit religion); Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works., 426 U.S. 736, 745 (1976) (proposed test would uphold all grants to sectarian colleges,
if money not used to propagate religion, as incidental benefits to religious institutions); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (proposed test would uphold state bond program for private
college construction, even if school pervasively sectarian, as incidental benefit to religion); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971) (proposed test would uphold university grants not
used to propagate religion, even if religion permeated schools, as incidental benefit to religion).
See generally Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 69
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prayer in public schools, but it would permit educational aid that benefited
parochial schools as long as that aid was not used to foster particular religious beliefs. 83
VII.

CONCLUSION: CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOTI 8

The evolution of modern establishment clause jurisprudence has produced
a series of difficult burdens. States have been burdened with the requirement
that they carefully avoid legislation that may benefit religion, which has limited the states capacity to render educational aid to all of its students, and
has deprived them from furthering the broadly beneficial social welfare programs sponsored by religious organizations. Religious organizations have
been burdened with the pejorative connotations implicated by the building of
Jefferson's "wall of separation," connotations which imply that the presence
of religion in civil affairs contaminates those affairs. The Court burdened
itself with the task of formulating a test to support an establishment clause
philosophy that had become enslaved to Jefferson's metaphor. The difficulty
of this task has been plainly evident in the torturous development, refinement, rejection, and revival of the Lemon test. All of these substantial burdens owe their origin to a simple metaphorical phrase that Thomas Jefferson
wrote in a conciliatory letter to the Danbury Baptist Association in 1802,
over ten years after the the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
Religious issues in contemporary America potentially breed passionate divisiveness, which may account for the Court's diffidence in directly addressing the intractable problems which have effectively disabled its current
establishment clause jurisprudence. Additionally, forty-three years of
caselaw, however inconsistent, have reinforced Jefferson's "wall of separation," a fact which militates strongly against its abandonment as the guiding
(1961) (denying funding to parochial school violates religion clause because denial based upon

impermissible religious classification).
183. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU,

-

U.S ....

109 S. Ct. 3086, 3115-16,

106 L. Ed. 2d 472, 510-11 (1989). The proposed test would have produced a different outcome
in County of Allegheny by holding the creche and menorah displays unconstitutional, but permitting the Christmas tree display. Id.; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68-69 (1985). The
proposed test would have reached the same outcome Wallace produced by holding compulsory
school prayer unconstitutional. Id.; Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968).
The proposed test would support educational benefits to parochial school students, such as
those at issue in Allen, as long as the appropriated public funds were not used to propagate
religion. Id.
184. See WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY - UNABRIDGED 787 (2d
ed. 1983). Greek legend relates that King Gordius of Phyrigia tied a knot which, according to
an oracle, would be untied by the future ruler of Asia. Id. Alexander the Great, failing to
untie the knot, cut it with his sword. Id. Webster defines a "Gordian knot" as any perplexing
problem, and "cutting the Gordian knot" means finding "a quick, efficient solution for a
perplexing problem." Id.
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symbol of establishment clause jurisprudence. The Gordian Knot that contemporary establishment clause analysis has become cannot easily be undone. The Court will have to cut through its raveled jurisprudence to a
solution faithful to the originalist methodology adopted by the Court in Everson. Thus, the Court should abandon the residual restrictions of Jefferson's ill-conceived wall, effectively embodied by the Lemon test, and adopt a
reformulated approach derived from an objective, analytical recovery of
what the framers originally intended by the words "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion."
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